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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No.

9851
TERRY D. LOUDEN,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
The appellant has appealed from his conviction of
second degree burglary in violation of 76-9-3, U. C. A.
1953, upon jury trial in the Third Judicial District, Salt
Lake County, State of Utah.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent submits the following statement of
facts, as being the evidence of the case when construed
most favorably to the conviction.
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During the night of July 22-23, 1962, the Harmon City
Shopping Center in Salt Lake County was burglarized (R.
54, 55) . Various display cases were rummaged and a PepsiCola machine located in the premises was broken into and
$10~00 removed (R. 65). In addition, one .22 caliber pistol
(Exhibit 1), two watches (Exhibits 2 and 3), and a Polaroid camera (Exhibit 4) were taken from the building.
The exhibits (1, 2, 3, and 4) were identified as the
items taken from the store as the result of the burglary.
During the course of the investigation into the burglary, the Salt Lake County Sheriff's department received
an anonymous tip, and as a result attempted to locate the
defendant and his companion (R. 74). Two deputy sheriffs
went to the Spiking Motel where appellant was staying.
They induced the manager to allow them into the room
occupied by the appellant and his companion (R. 75). During this search, all the officers noted was a loaded revolver
in the bureau, which serial number matched the revolver
taken during the Harmon City burglary (R. 75). Thereafter, the deputies left the room and waited outside for the
return of appellant. The appellant returned with his companion and entered the motel room (R. 76). Thereafter,
the two deputies approached the room. Although they had
drawn their guns as they approached the room, they put
them back in their holsters before going in the room. The
door to the room was open (R. 83). The deputies asked
appellant and his companion if they could come in and look
around (R. 76), to which appellant and his companion indicated they could and that they had no objections (R. 76).
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According to one officer, the reply was, "Yes, you can come
in and look around" (R. 76). Thereafter, the deputies asked
if they could search appellant and his companion, and the
appellant indicated it was all right (R. 84, 85). During the
course of the search, the gun was confiscated, and in addition, the two watches (Exhibits 2 and 3).
Subsequently, the appellant was taken down to the
County jail. Some two days later appellant was questioned
by the police (R. 78). At the time of questioning, the ap~
pellant said he gave the Polaroid camera to the landlady at
the Spiking Motel for rent due (R. 79). With reference to
the Harmon City burglary, appellant told the police (R.
78, 80) :
"He said that he went there about 2 :30 in the
morning, pried open the back door and looked
around for the safe and couldn't find it; had rummaged through the cashier's desk and couldn't find
any money there, and so he took a pistol, Polaroid
camera, various watches and some crow bars."
No promises of leniency or anything else were made
at that time (R. 79). Thereafter, some promises of leniency
were made to induce confessions to other crimes not the
subject of the instant prosecution; and further, a written
confession was taken but not used. Only the oral statement
was used which was given prior to any promises of leniency.
Thereafter, the officers picked up the camera from
the motel landlady (R. 80).
Prior to trial, the appellant made a motion to suppress
all the evidence found in the appellant's motel room on the
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grounds that it was secured by an illegal search and seizure
(R. 8). The motion was heard with the trial court receiving the appellant's testimony and a transcript of evidence
of the deputy sheriff at the preliminary hearing. (Appendix to record.) The motion was apparently denied (R.
68). Thereafter, during the trial, appellant renewed his
motion to suppress, and further requested an out of jury
hearing on the issue of the voluntariness of the confession
and on search and seizure. The court refused the out of
court hearing on the confession, although counsel stated
the substance of the expected testimony to the judge, and
apparently only wanted the State's witnesses to be subjected to cross-examination before the jury heard them (R.
69). Although the appellant took exception to the procedure, it is not clear whether his exception related only
to the confession upon which he had already, through counsel, expressed himself, or to the issue of search and seizure
(R. 72).
No evidence on the voluntariness of the confession
was put to the jury by the appellant.
Finally, appellant preserved no part of the record on
his requested instructions and apparently took no exceptions to the court's failure, if any, to give such instructions.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
NO REVERSIBLE ERROR WAS COMMITTED
IN REFUSING APPELLANT AN OUT OF
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COURT HEARING ON THE ADMISSIBILITY
OF HIS STATEMENT TO THE POLICE SINCE:
A.

THE ORAL STATEMENT ADMITTED
WAS AN ADMISSION, NOT A CONFESSION.

B.

APPELLANT PRESENTED THE NATURE
OF HIS TESTIMONY TO THE COURT,
AND THE COURT DETERMINED TO
PLACE IT BEFORE THE JURY, THUS
AFFORDING APPELLANT HIS INITIAL
JUDICIAL CONSIDERATION.

C.

APPELLANT DID NOT MAKE CLEAR HIS
OBJECTION TO THE PROCEDURE FOLLOWED WITH REFERENCE TO THE ADMISSION OF THE STATEMENT AND
MADE NO OBJECTION TO THE ADMISSION OF THE STATEMENT WHEN PRESENTED TO THE JURY.

A. The appellant contends that the trial court erred
in not granting a preliminary hearing, out of the presence
of the jury, to rule on the admissibility of the appellant's
oral statement to the police. The appellant apparently
considered the statement to be a confession. The statement
is set out on page 79 of the record, and generally is as follows:
"Q. All right. What was said; what was the
conversation in regard to this Harmon City Shopping Center incident?
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"A. Well, Mr. Lowden told me that he had
given the Polaroid camera to the landlady at the
Spiking Motel for rent that was due; or she was
going to hold this until he had paid the rent.
"Q. Did he tell you anything as to where he
got the Polaroid camera or these other articles?

"A. Yes. And subsequent to him telling me
about the camera, he told me all about the job at
Harmon City.
"Q.

What did he say?

"A. He said that he went there about 2 :30 in
the morning, pried open the back door and looked
around for the safe and couldn't find it; had rummaged through the cashier's desk and couldn't find
any money there, and so he took a pistol, Polaroid
camera, various watches and some crow bars."
It is admitted that the rule laid down in State v. Crank,
105 Utah 332, 142 P. 2d 178 (1943), requires that the trial
court, independently of the jury, review all the evidence of
the voluntariness of a confession, and then if it determines
the confession to be voluntary, it may admit both the statement and the circumstances surrounding the taking of the
statement for the jury's consideration. 1

However, this rule is not applicable to the case of an
admission. Thus, in State v. Masato Karumai, 101 Utah
592, 126 P. 2d 1047 (1942), this court noted:
"A confession is the admission of guilt by the
defendant of all the necessary elements of the crime
lThe holding of the Crank case and State v. Braasch, 119 Utah 450, 229
P. 2d 2 8 9 ( 1 9 51) , that the jury should not be instructed to disregard
the confession if they determine it involuntary is in doubt. Rogers V.
Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
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of which he is charged, including the necessary acts
and intent. An admission merely admits some fact
which connects or tends to connect the defendant
with the offense but not with all the elements of the
crime. State v. Johnson, 95 Utah 572, 83 P. 2d
1010; People v. Fowler, 178 Cal. 657, 174 P. 892;
State v. Carroll, 52 Wyo. 29, 69 P. 2d 542; State v.
Stevens, 60 Mont. 390, 199 P. 256.
"Although there are some cases to the contrary, the great weight of authority and the betterreasoned cases hold that before receiving an admission-as distinguished from a confession-in evidence, it is not necessary that a preliminary showing be made to the effect that the statement was
voluntary."
In that case the court commented with references to
the statement taken:
"In the statement testified to there was no express admission of the guilt of any crime of which
defendant was charged. Construed against defendant in its strongest possible light, it was, at most,
merely an admission that the defendant killed the
deceased because deceased was no good. * * *"
Applying that case to the instant facts, it is apparent
that the testimony of the police officer as to the statement
made by the appellant amounted to no more than a statement of admissions. There was no admission of the intent
to commit a criminal offense at the time of the breaking,
nor any complete admission of total responsibility. What
was said was merely several factual statements as to what
was done. This is not sufficient to constitute a confession,
and, consequently, the failure to grant an out of court
hearing was not error.
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B. It is submitted that no reversible error exists even
if the appellant's statement to the police is deemed an admission, since a hearing was held out of court where the
judge heard the nature of the appellant's evidence, although
through counsel, and, thereafter determined to present the
matter to the jury (R. 69). Since the judge thereafter
determined to present the statement to the jury, he, in
effect, determined that there was not sufficient basis to
the appellant's objection to rule as a matter of law that the
confession was involuntary. This being so, the appellant
had all he was entitled to from an out of court hearing.
State v. Braasch, 119 Utah 450, 229 P. 2d 289 ( 1951). He
could thereafter, if he so decided, raise the same facts before the jury-however, he did not do so. Consequently,
it cannot be claimed that any prejudice resulted to the appellant.
C. At the time of the out of court hearing on how
the defendant's statement should be handled, the question
of the evidence as to search and seizure and how it should
be handled was also considered. The record reflects the
following (R. 72) :
"MR. ROSS: That's what I want to do now
is clean up the record. Then it's your ruling, is it
not, that my-that you will hear the evidence both
as to the illegal search-that all evidence of this
witness will come in and then you will hear any
motions I have as to the illegal search and seizure?
"THE COURT: And as to the alleged confession, if any. And those motions may be argued outside the presence of the jury and before the matter
is submitted to the jury.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

"MR. ROSS: All right. I'll take my exception
to that at this time."
The appellant did not make it clear as to what he was
objecting to. The discussions immediately before related
to search and seizure problems. Since the appellant did
not clearly object to the procedure to be followed as to the
alleged confession, he cannot be heard at the appellate stage
to complain. State v. Mathews, 13 Utah 2d 391, 394, 375
P. 2d 392 (1962).
Additionally, it is submitted that the appellant waived
any contention as to the voluntariness of the statement he
gave the deputy sheriff. No evidence was presented of any
kind to rebut the testimony of the sheriff that all promises
of immunity came subsequent to the statement received in
evidence. Nor was any objection made to the admission of
the sheriff's testimony. Consequently, it is submitted the
appellant waived any right to complain. State v. Fraser,
107 Utah 454, 154 P. 2d 752 (1944).
It is submitted, therefore, that there is no basis for
reversal on the issue of appellant's statement to the police.
POINT II.
NO BASIS FOR REVERSAL EXISTS ON THE
CLAIM OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE.
The appellant contends in Point 2 of his brief that the
trial court erred in refusing to grant the defendant's motion to suppress and in admitting into evidence the prop-
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erty seized by deputy sheriffs during the search of the
motel room in which the appellant was staying.
Although the United States Supreme Court has ruled
that evidence procured by an unlawful search and seizure
may not be used in state courts, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S.
643 (1961), the determination of what conduct is "unreasonable" is still a matter for state determination. In Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 190 Atl. 304 (Pa. 1963), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted :
"In passing upon the 'reasonableness' of a
search and seizure, a preliminary and most important, question is whether Mapp requires that state
courts determine the 'reasonableness' of such search
and seizure in accordance with federal or state standards. To that question Mapp gives no direct answer. However, a study of Mapp would indicate
that, at least by implication, state courts are still
free to apply their own, rather than the federal,
criteria of 'reasonableness'."
See also Commonwealth v. Richards, 198 Pa.
Super. 42, 182 A. 2d 293 (1962).
Other courts have also followed the Pennsylvania reasoning. State v. Smith, 37 N. J. 481, 181 A. 2d 761, 767
( 1962); People v. Mickelson, 30 Cal. Rptr. 18, 380 P. 2d
658 ( 1963); People v. Ruiz, 196 Cal. App. 2d 695, 16 Cal.
Rptr. 855; People v. Tyler, 193 Cal. App. 728, 14 Cal. Rptr.
610.
Consequently, in determining whether the action in this
instance was reasonable, federal standards are not wholly
applicable.
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In the instant case, the police officers acting upon an
anonymous tip, approached the motel where the appellant
was staying and requested the manager to allow them to
look around the appellant's room. The manager allowed
the officers to search the room. The officers found a pistol
taken from the Harmon City burglary (Exhibit 1). Thereafter, they left the room and waited for appellant and his
companion to return. Shortly after appellant returned
(and again construing the evidence most favorable to the
conviction, State v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 34, 347 P. 2d 865
(1959)), the police approached the room with drawn guns,
but holstered them before reaching and entering the appellant's ·room. The door to the room was open and the
police first identified themselves and asked if they could
enter, to which they received an affirmative reply from
the occupants, "Yes, you can come in and look around" (R.
76). Thereafter, the officers entered and asked the appellant if his person could be searched and he agreed. Exhibit 1, which the officers already knew about, was seized.
Exhibits 2 and 3, which the officers had not discovered,
were also taken. Exhibit 4 was not discovered by virtue of
any unlawful search. The room where the appellant was
located and staying was rented to a Mr. Carrell who paid
the rent (R. 101), although it was apparently due at the
time of the search.
In 79 C. J. S., Searches and Seizures, § 98, it is noted:
"One who seeks affirmative relief on the
ground that officers violated his constitutional
rights in making a search has the burden of estab-
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lishing facts from which it will affirmatively appear that his rights were invaded."
Consequently, the appellant had the duty of demonstrating the illegality of the search. In the first instance
as to the right of the police to search with the manager's
consent, Varon, Searches and Seizures, Vol. 1, p. 439
(1961) notes:
"In the case of owners, landlords and tenants
there have been many decisions in the various
courts throughout the nation that define the rights
of each and although the greater weight of authority appears to hold that owners of property and
landlords under leases and tenancy agreements have
the right to consent to a search of their property,
there is a question that is meritoriously raised when
the rights of the tenants in possession are absolute."
The appellant offered no evidence to show that the
motel manager had no right to allow inspection or search
of the premises. Where the room was actually let to someone other than appellant, where the rent was apparently
due, and where no evidence was introduced as to the terms
of occupancy, it certainly may be concluded that the appellant has not carried his burden of showing the landlady
had no authority to permit the room to be searched. In
People v. Dillard, 168 Cal. App. 2d 158, 335 P. 2d 702
( 1959), the court noted as to a similar situation:
"As her first ground for reversal appellant
urges that the entry of the officers into her apartment during her absence was in violation of her
constitutional rights and that the evidence produced
against her was obtained through an illegal search
and seizure. In this regard, as heretofore set forth,
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when the officers arrived at appellant's apartment
they knocked on the door several times and receiving no response they approached the manager who
in response to their request opened the door for
them. When they entered they discovered the marihuana seeds on the bed. Appellant does not contend
that the manager had no authority to enter the
apartment, and the manager testified that he voluntarily permitted the officers to enter. On the occasion of the first visit of the officers to appellant's
apartment, there was no search. The contraband
was plainly visible when the officers entered. The
situation here presented is analogous to that existing in People v. Ambrose, 155 Cal. App. 2d 513, at
page 523, 318 P. 2d 181, at page 188, wherein we
said:
" 'The officers asked the hotel manager for
authority to enter the room whereupon he opened
the door and let them in. The question of consent
is to be determined by the trier of fact (citing
cases). Upon the authority of People v. Gorg, 45
Cal. 2d 776, 783, 291 P. 2d 469, and People v. Caritativo, 46 Cal. 2d 68, 73, 292 P. 2d 513, we are
persuaded that appellant's contention must be rejected. In the cited case it is held that where the
officers have acted in good faith with the consent
of a homeowner or landlord in conducting a search,
and the latter believed they had joint control over
the premises, and the right to enter them, evidence
so obtained cannot be excluded merely because the
officers may have made a reasonable mistake as to
the extent of the owner or landlord's authority. See
also People v. Silva, 140 Cal. App. 2d 791, 794-795,
295 P. 2d 942.'"
Consequently, it is submitted appellant has failed to
show an illegal search of the premises.
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Secondly, it is submitted that even if the original
search were invalid, for several reasons appellant may not
complain.
First, it is submitted that if the first search was illegal,
the subsequent search was made with the consent of the
appellant, and having consented to the subsequent search
wherein the gun was seized, he thereby ratified what had
been done before. In People v. Allen, 142 Cal. App. 2d 267,
298 P. 2d 714 (1956), the California court so held. The
appellant's reliance upon Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920), is not applicable, since
in that case, after the illegal search, the internal revenue
service sought to subpoena the records discovered by the
search. There was no question of a voluntary relinquishment or ratification by subsequent conduct. Certainly,
there is nothing unreasonable about holding that consent
to search waives any previous illegality occurring by a
prior search where the same contraband is on the premises.
It is just as probable that consent would have been given
before, under the same circumstances, had the appellant
been present. Consequently, no logical basis exists not to
find a ratification or waiver.
Nor is there any basis to the claim that there was no
consent to the second search. The question of consent or
no consent is primarily a matter of fact to be determined
by the trial court before ruling on the admissibility of the
evidence, and hence the legality of the search. People v.
Fischer, 49 Cal. 2d 442, 317 P. 2d 967. The only real issue
is whether the evidence before the court would not as a
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matter of law support a conclusion that the appellant consented to the search.
It is recognized that consent must be freely given and
not merely acquiesced in by the person whose premises or
person is being searched. Johnson v. United States, 333
U. S. 10 (1948). However, in the instant case, the police
requested permission to search and received it before ever
going about the search. Nor did the appellant merely acquiesce in the officers' request. On the contrary, an affirmative invitation was made to the police to look around.
Although the police had originally drawn their guns, they
were holstered before entering and requesting permission
to search. In People v. Torres, 158 Cal. App. 2d 213, 322
P. 2d 300 (1958), the court noted the following facts:
"The facts bearing upon this narrow issue may
be stated briefly. At approximately 6 :00 p.m. on
March 19, 1957, Officer King of the Narcotics Division of the Los Angeles Police Department was informed by Sergeant Bitterhoff of the Robbery Division that a man named Tony residing at 136 West
69th Street was selling narcotics. At approximately
9 :45 p.m. on March 19, 1957, Officer King was
standing in front of the residence at the given address when appellant (whose nickname was Tony)
opened the door and came out. The officers identified themselves as police officers and stated to appellant that they had information that he was using
and dealing in narcotics. He denied the accusatory
statement. The officers then asked him whether
'it would be all right if we'd look in the house.' Appellant answered, 'Yes, go ahead.' "
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Based thereon, the court ruled the search voluntary,
commenting:
"A search of a house with the express, free and
voluntary consent of a householder suspected of
possessing narcotics is neither unreasonable nor
unlawful. It follows that contraband found and
seized in the course of such a search may lawfully
and properly be received in evidence against the accused. People v. Burke, 47 Cal. 2d 45, 301 P. 2d
241; People V. Michael, 45 Cal. 2d 751, 290 P. 2d
852; People v. Hood, 149 Cal. App. 2d 836, 309 P.
2d 135. It is true, as pointed out in People v.
Michael, supra, that one need not forcibly resist
an officer's assertion of authority to search, but if
he freely consents to a search, then neither the
search nor the seizure of evidence found in the
course thereof is unreasonable. As the court there
stated ( 45 Cal. 2d at page 753, 290 P. 2d at page
854), 'Whether in a particular case an apparent
consent was in fact voluntarily given or was in
submission to an express or implied assertion of
authority, is a question of fact to be determined in
the light of all the circumstances.' To the same
effect are People v. Lujan, 141 Cal. App. 2d 143,
296 P. 2d 93, and People v. Gorg, 45 Cal. 2d 776,
291 P. 2d 469. Since the question is one of fact primarily for the trial court's determination, the finding of that court, supported by substantial evidence,
is binding upon an appellate court. People v. Hood,
supra, 149 Cal. App. 2d 836, 838, 309 P. 2d 135;
People v. Allen, 142 Cal. App. 2d 267, 281, 298 P.
2d 714; People v. Smith, 141 Cal. App. 2d 399, 402,
296 P. 2d 913."
See also People v. Burke, 47 Cal. 2d 45, 301 P. 2d 241
( 1956), where the California Supren1e Court found similar
facts sufficient to show consent.
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Finally, since there was consent to the search, during
which Exhibits 2 and 3 were seized, and since Exhibit 4
was not the subject of search and seizure, and since these
three exhibits were admitted in evidence as coming from
the burglary, and adding to these facts the defendant's
admission of theft from Harmon City, it is difficult to see
how the admission of Exhibit 1, even if the subject of an
illegal search and seizure, could have prejudiced the appellant's position where the other evidence was so conclusive
of guilt.
POINT III.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS ACTION
ON DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION REQUESTS.
Appellant finally contends that the court erred in failing to give the appellant's instructions 3 through 7. These
instructions do not specifically appear to have been requested during the trial, but merely appear to have been
filed with the clerk the same day as the trial (R. 15, et
seq.). The instructions concern the statement made by
the appellant to the police while in custody. The court apparently did not give any instructions on that matter (R.
19-34). However, no exceptions to the failure to give any
instructions appear of record. In the absence of exceptions,
the appellant cannot complain of any error unless the
error was so apparent as to deny the appellant a fair trial.
State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P. 2d 952 (1936); State v.
Peterson, 121 Utah 229, 240 P. 2d 504; State v. Hines, 6
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Utah 2d 126, 307 P. 2d 887 (1957). Since the evidence in
the instant case, as it was before the jury, showed no possible claim of coercion or impropriety in taking the statement actually admitted, there was no error in not giving
the instructions. On direct examination, the sheriff's deputy testified that no promises of any kind were made prior
to the time the statement was given that was placed before
the jury. He adhered to that position on cross-examination.
All that was admitted was that a promise was made, subsequent to the taking of the statement that was placed before the jury. No evidence appears to rebut that position.
Consequently, there was no issue of fact or dispute so as
to require an instruction to be given the jury. The appellant is not entitled to abstract instructions of legal principals not raised by the evidence, State v. Thompson, 110
Utah 113, 170 P. 2d 153, and has no basis for complaint.

CONCLUSION
The appellant has raised several claims of error, but
an analysis of the alleged errors demonstrates that there
is no basis for reversal. The conviction should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KESLER,
Attorney General,
RONALD N. BOYCE,
Deputy Attorney General,

Attorneys for Respondent.
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